

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MOODY WOODROW TANKSLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

SACRAMENTO ROOM & BOARD, et al.

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-1970 JAM DB PS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff Moody Woodrow Tanksley is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was referred to the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pending before the court are plaintiff's complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) Plaintiff complains about an incident in which he was bitten by spiders.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by parties proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Here, plaintiff's complaint is deficient. Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, the undersigned will recommend that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.

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I. Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application makes the financial showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, a determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for in forma pauperis status does not complete the inquiry required by the statute. "A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit." Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Department of Child Support Services, 584 Fed. Appx. 638 (9th Cir. 2014) ("the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee's request to proceed IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee's action is frivolous or without merit"); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) ("It is the duty of the District Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.").

Moreover, the court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of poverty is found to be untrue or if it is determined that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Under this standard, a court must dismiss a complaint as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245

(9th Cir. 1989). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

The minimum requirements for a civil complaint in federal court are as follows:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

II. Plaintiff's Complaint

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that in September of 2020, plaintiff was staying at Sacramento Room and Board. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 3.) Plaintiff was bitten by a spider. (Id.) The Sacramento Fire Department responded and "refused" plaintiff medical treatment. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges claims for "life threat . . . of getting bitten by unknown spiders," and "unfit home." (Id. at 3-4.) From these allegations, however, it is entirely unclear what claim plaintiff is attempting to assert and what are the alleged wrongful actions of any defendant.

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claims and must allege facts that state the elements of each claim plainly and succinctly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancements.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which the defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff's claims. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649.

Moreover, the complaint purports to be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 1.) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that,

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[e]very person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

“Because the Fire Department is a municipal department within the City of Sacramento it is not a ‘person’ subject who can be sued pursuant to § 1983.”¹ Jewett v. City of Sacramento Fire Dept., No. CIV. 2:10-0556 WBS KJN, 2010 WL 3212774, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010). The Sacramento Fire Department is instead a municipal department of the City of Sacramento. “Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality.” Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting Stump v. Gates, 777 F. Supp. 808, 816 (D. Colo. 1991)).

“In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipality may not be held liable for a § 1983 violation under a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of its subordinates.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). In this regard, “[a] government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

Thus, municipal liability in a § 1983 case may be premised upon: (1) an official policy; (2) a “longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity;” (3) the act of an “official whose acts fairly represent official policy such that the challenged action constituted official policy;” or (4) where “an official with final policy-making authority delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.” Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008).

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¹ The complaint does not allege whether “Sacramento Room and Board” is a municipal or private defendant. If it is a municipal defendant the above Monell analysis is applicable. If it is a private entity, § 1983 is unlikely to apply to its conduct. See Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center, 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999) (“§ 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrong”).

To sufficiently plead a Monell claim, allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). At a minimum, the complaint should “identif[y] the challenged policy/custom, explain[] how the policy/custom was deficient, explain[] how the policy/custom caused the plaintiff harm, and reflect[] how the policy/custom amounted to deliberate indifference[.]” Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also Little v. Gore, 148 F.Supp.3d 936, 957 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (“Courts in this circuit now generally dismiss claims that fail to identify the specific content of the municipal entity’s alleged policy or custom.”).

Here, the complaint contains no allegations related to an official policy or custom.

II. Leave to Amend

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed. The undersigned has carefully considered whether plaintiff may amend the complaint to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. “Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall be freely given, the court does not have to allow futile amendments). In light of the deficiencies noted above, the undersigned finds that it would be futile to grant plaintiff leave to amend in this case.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s October 1, 2020 application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be denied;
2. Plaintiff’s October 1, 2020 complaint (ECF No. 1) be dismissed without leave to amend; and
3. This action be dismissed.

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1 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge
2 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days
3 after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections
4 with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections to Magistrate
5 Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within
6 the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal the District Court’s
7 order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

8 Dated: March 25, 2021

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11 DEBORAH BARNES
12 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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